

# Inherent Information Survivability

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
DARPA/ITO

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### Layered Defense

Tolerate Detect Prevent




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#### DARPA Strategy


#### **ITO**

Address Critical Technology Gaps



#### **ISO**


Integration for Balanced Protection






#### Roadmap

Inherent Survivability 1999-2003



ISO Info Assurance 1997-2000



**Information Survivability** 1995-1999






#### Accomplishments

Local Strong
Detection Barriers

Information Survivability Program


1995-1999






### Strong Barriers


Develop strong
barriers to
penetration at all
system levels








#### Middleware: CORBA



Access Control

Authentication

**ORB Gateway** 



Client Enclaves

Server Enclave

#### OS:Nested Processes

Untrusted App

Security Manager


Trusted App

Process Manager

Microkernel










## Local Intrusion Detection

Detect attacks
locally with high
confidence and low
false alarm rate



#### Intrusion Detection


- State-of-the-Practice
  - -Pattern matching on known attacks
- Program focus
  - -Statistical Anomaly Detection
  - -Model-Based Profiles

Detect Previously Unknown Attacks






### Sample Results




#### Old vs New Attacks





### New Directions

Intrusion Global
Tolerance Detection




Inherent Survivability Program

1999-2003




#### Global Detection



Distinguish events of elevated significance from those of only local interest


## Common Intrusion Detection Framework



- E Event Generator
- A Event Analyzer
- D Event Database
- C Controller




#### Intrusion Assessment







## Intrusion Tolerant Systems



Maximize ability to continue critical operations following partial compromise








#### Tolerant Software

Analogy to Mechanical Parts



#### **Tolerate:**

- Imprecision
- Completeness
- Latency

#### **Ideas**

- Active interfaces
- Probabilistic methods



### Artificial Diversity

Example: Buffer Overflow Attack

**Attack Code** 

Return Address

Canary


Buffer



- 2. Checked before return
- 1. Random string inserted on stack



# Intrusion Tolerant Networks



Maximize residual capacity of network infrastructure following partial compromise

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## Denying Denial-of-Service

Constrain attacker's resource consumption

- Market-Based Allocation
- Progress-Based Protocols





